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Impacts of “Three Strikes and You’re Out” on Crime Trends 
in California and throughout the United States 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 The impacts of Three Strikes on crime in California and throughout the U.S. are analyzed 
using cross-sectional time series analysis of state-level data from 1986 to 2005.  The model 
measures both deterrence and incapacitation effects, controlling for pre-existing crime trends and 
economic, demographic, and policy factors.  Despite limited usage outside California, the 
presence of a Three Strikes law appears to be associated with slightly but significantly faster 
rates of decline in robbery, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft nationwide.  Three Strikes 
is also associated with slower declines in murder rates.  Although California’s law is the broadest 
and most-frequently-used Three Strikes policy, it has not produced greater incapacitation effects 
on crime than other states’ far more limited laws.  The analyses indicate that the “toughest” 
sentencing policy is not necessarily the most effective option.   
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Impacts of “Three Strikes and You’re Out” on Crime Trends 
in California and throughout the United States 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Between the years 1993 and 1997, “Three Strikes and You’re Out” sentencing laws were 
passed in twenty-four American states and the federal justice system.1  Three Strikes laws 
mandate long sentences for certain habitual offenders, usually 25 years to life in prison for third-
time violent offenders.  Three Strikes statutes vary widely in their details, such as the type and 
number of offenses that trigger the law’s application, the prior offenses that qualify as “strikes,” 
and the penalties associated with second and third “strikes” (Austin, Clark, Hardyman, & Henry, 
1999; Austin, Jones, Naro, & Cohen, 1996; Clark, Austin, & Henry, 1997).  The broadest and 
farthest-reaching Three Strikes statute was enacted by the state of California in 1994.  As of 
October 2005, over 87,500 individuals had been sentenced under the second- and third-strike 
provisions of California’s Three Strikes law, including over 7,500 offenders who received a 
sentence of twenty-five years to life in prison for a third strike (Legislative Analyst's Office, 
2005).  Because of its scope, California’s law has been associated with tremendous monetary and 
social costs.  This paper examines whether the law has produced commensurate reductions in 
crime that would justify the costs and consequences associated with a policy of its breadth.    
Prior Research on Three Strikes and its Impacts on Crime  
 
Several studies of Three Strikes laws in California and elsewhere have been published 
since the mid-1990s.  One of the earliest studies, conducted at RAND before Three Strikes took 
effect, predicted that California’s broad policy could reduce crime by about twenty-five percent 
in the state, at a cost of about $5.5 billion per year, but that the benefits and the costs would 
                                                 
1 A “Three Strikes”-type law was also passed in a twenty-fifth state, Alaska, in 2006. 
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depend on full implementation of the law, which the RAND researchers did not anticipate 
(Greenwood et al., 1994).  
Not long after the law went into effect, supporters of Three Strikes pointed to dramatic 
declines in California’s crime rates following the law’s passage and claimed that Three Strikes 
deserved credit for the changes (Ardaiz, 2000; Lungren, 1996, 1997; Reynolds, 1995).  Mike 
Reynolds, a former wedding photographer whose daughter’s murder had inspired him to co-
author the California Three Strikes law and campaign for its passage, stated bluntly, “the results 
are in and the debate is over.  The numbers prove that when you get tough, you get results” 
(Reynolds, 1995).  In a 1998 report, California Attorney General Dan Lungren credited the law 
for California’s 20.2 percent total crime drop, and the 13.8 percent decline in violent crime from 
1994 to 1997 (Lungren, 1998).  Revisiting the issue in a 2005 report, Reynolds cited a 46 percent 
decline in the index crime rate from 1992 to 2002 and again asserted that the data proved the 
law’s success, proclaiming, “the reduction in crime that occurred after the passage of 3-Strikes 
speaks for itself… any objective assessment would credit 3-Strikes with playing a major role in 
California’s record crimes [sic] drops” (Reynolds, 2005). 
On the other side of the issue, opponents have asserted that Three Strikes has caused little 
or no impact on crime.  A 1999 study released by the Justice Policy Institute (Males, Macallair, 
& Taqi-Eddin, 1999) criticized the law strongly, calling it a “failure” and concluding that it had 
had no effects on crime because declines in crime were not especially pronounced for (1) states 
with Three Strikes, (2) counties in California reputed to apply the law particularly strictly, or (3) 
the over-thirty age group, which ought to have been impacted most by Three Strikes.  The study 
compared changes in crime rates in two time periods, 1991-93 (before 3 Strikes) and 1995-97 
(after 3 Strikes) (Males et al., 1999; Schiraldi, Colburn, & Lotke, 2004). 
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The simple before-and-after comparisons used by these advocates and critics of the law 
are easy to comprehend but lack methodological rigor.  They fail to account for important 
factors, such as the fact that crime rates had begun to decline before Three Strikes was 
introduced, and they omit other key variables that influence crime rates.   
More sophisticated analyses have been conducted by academic researchers, producing a 
wide range of conclusions.  Employing a two-stage least squares model to analyze California 
county-level panel data from 1983 through 1996, Shepherd (2002b) concludes that the two- and 
three-strikes provisions of California’s law resulted in significant deterrent effects on murder, 
assault, robbery, and burglary rates.2  In contrast, other scholarly studies, using various data 
sources and methodologies, find that the law’s impacts on crime have been modest (Stolzenberg 
& D'Alessio, 1997; Zimring, Kamin, & Hawkins, 1999), nonexistent or undetectable (Austin et 
al., 1999; Beres & Griffith, 1998; Males et al., 1999), or even counterproductive.  Some 
researchers have concluded that the laws have resulted in an increase in homicides as offenders 
facing strikes sentences seek to evade law enforcement authorities or eliminate witnesses 
(Kovandzic, Sloan, & Vieraitis, 2002, 2004; Marvell & Moody, 2001).  Studies also link Three 
Strikes to other actual or predicted unintended consequences, such as strain on local law 
enforcement operations, jail systems, and courts (Austin, 1994; Austin et al., 1999; California 
Youth and Adult Correctional Agency - Board of Corrections, 1996), prison overcrowding and 
increased rates of release from prison (Dickey, 1996, 1998), and escalating costs in the long-term 
as affected prisoners grow older and require more expensive care (Auerhahn, 1999, 2002; R. S. 
King & Mauer, 2001; Schmertmann, Amankwaa, & Long, 1998).  Finally, some scholars have 
pointed out that mandatory sentences like Three Strikes have led to tremendous social costs, such 
                                                 
2 Shepherd’s study also found a statistically significant increase in larceny rates. 
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as those associated with mass incarceration of offenders and their eventual re-entry to society 
(Mauer & Chesney-Lind, 2002; Travis, 2002; Travis & Waul, 2003). 
Several reports completed in the 1990s and early 2000s include the caveat that sufficient 
data to measure the law’s full impacts on crime might not be available for several years, 
particularly because the incapacitation effects associated with lengthy mandatory sentences 
would only be observed after affected offenders completed the sentences they would already 
have faced in the law’s absence (Austin et al., 1999; Greenwood et al., 1994; J. R. Ramirez & 
Crano, 2003).  Now that more than a decade has passed since the law’s adoption, sufficient post-
implementation data exist to conduct more rigorous analyses.  Ramirez and Crano (2003) use 
ARIMA and regression models to analyze monthly statewide crime and arrest data from 
California for the years 1983 to 1998.  Controlling for pre-existing crime trends, they detect few 
immediate impacts of Three Strikes, some deterrence and incapacitation effects over time for 
violent and premeditated “instrumental” offenses and for “minor” crimes not targeted by Three 
Strikes, and no impacts on drug offenses.  Worrall’s 2004 study uses a cross-sectional time series 
model with fixed effects for years and counties to examine Three Strikes’ effects using data on 
California’s counties from 1989 to 2000.  In contrast to Ramirez and Crano (2003), Worrall’s 
investigation finds that the law has “virtually no deterrent or incapacitative effects on serious 
crime” once county fixed effects are taken into account (Worrall, 2004).  Kovandzic, Sloan, and 
Vieratis (2002, 2004) apply cross-sectional time series analysis to data for 188 cities in the 
United States from 1980 to 2000.  In their 2004 study, the authors find that while significant 
declines in crime trends could be found for some offenses in some states in the aftermath of 
Three Strikes’ adoption, significant increases could be found in roughly the same number of 
states, suggesting either that the findings were either random statistical artifacts or that the law 
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has both positive and negative impacts that cancel each other out on the whole (Kovandzic et al., 
2004).  The only exception to this finding was for rates of homicide, for which more significant 
increases than declines were found (Kovandzic et al., 2004). 
Contributions of the Present Study to the Literature 
This paper examines the effects of Three Strikes on crime not only in California, but also 
throughout the nation, using state-level data for all fifty states.  The methods used in this paper 
are similar to those used in some of the more methodologically sophisticated recent studies (e.g. 
Worrall 2004, Kovandzic, Sloan, and Vieraitis 2004), but here they are applied to state-level, 
rather than city-level, data.  The dataset includes statistics from the years 1986 through 2005.  
This twenty-year time series provides the opportunity to model trends in crime and other 
variables for eight or nine years before, and eleven or twelve years after, the implementation of 
Three Strikes in most states (most of the laws were passed in 1994 or 1995).  The analysis 
consists of regression models applied to cross-sectional time series data with state and year fixed 
effects.  The inclusion of state fixed effects makes it possible to account for the underlying 
variation in crime rates between states.  As demonstrated by Worrall (2004) using county data, 
omission of pre-existing unit-level trends from time-series analyses can lead to misleading 
results.  Year fixed effects account for nationwide crime trends that may be associated with 
factors not directly included in the model.  Additional variables representing individual state-
level crime trends are also included for states that adopted Three Strikes as well as non-adopting 
states.  If these trends are not incorporated into the analysis, the impacts of Three Strikes are 
likely to be overestimated because crime rates had begun to drop even before Three Strikes was 
passed in most jurisdictions, and crime fell in jurisdictions without Three Strikes laws as well as 
in those that did pass them.  Alternative explanations that have been cited to explain changes in 
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crime rates are also taken into account by including relevant economic, demographic, budget, 
and alternative policy variables in the model. 
 
Comparison of Three Strikes Statutes in California and Other States 
 
 “Three Strikes and You’re Out” and other habitual offender mandatory sentencing laws 
exist in half of the American states.  The laws and the years in which they were adopted are 
summarized in Table 1 below.   
[Table 1 about here] 
While Three Strikes laws have punishment and deterrence among their goals, these 
policies are also based, in part, on the idea that a small proportion of habitual offenders commit 
most crimes, and that incarcerating the most active and incorrigible criminals will therefore 
dramatically improve public safety.3  “Selective incapacitation,” as this approach has been 
called, seeks to target the most dangerous offenders and design sentencing policies to incarcerate 
them during their most crime-prone years (Auerhahn, 1999, 2003; Gottfredson & Gottfredson, 
1994; Greenwood & Abrahamse, 1982).  Policymakers have not reached a consensus among 
regarding the most effective approach to selective incapacitation.  The number of offenses that 
trigger a “strike” charge, the categories of crimes that count as strikes, and the sentences 
mandated upon conviction vary from state to state (Caulkins, 2001; Clark et al., 1997).   
California’s version of the law differs markedly from statutes adopted elsewhere.  
California’s Three Strikes policy consists of two primary components.  First, if a defendant has a 
                                                 
3 In their seminal study, Delinquency in a Birth Cohort, Wolfgang and colleagues found that a small group of 
“chronic offenders,” constituting about 6 percent of males born in 1945 in Philadelphia, were responsible for over 50 
percent of the crimes committed by members of the entire group (Wolfgang, Figlio, & Sellin, 1972). 
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prior serious or violent felony conviction (i.e. “strike”) and is convicted of any subsequent 
felony, the sentence for the current felony is automatically doubled (Legislative Analyst's Office, 
2005).  This is often referred to as the “second strike” provision.  Second, if a defendant has two 
or more strikes, any subsequent felony conviction carries a mandatory “third strike” sentence of 
twenty-five years to life in prison (Legislative Analyst's Office, 2005).  In California, twenty-one 
violent felonies, listed in California penal code section 667.5(c), and forty-two serious felony 
offenses, attempted offenses, or enhancements, listed in California penal code section 1192.7(c) 
(with some overlap between these two groups), can count as strikes.  The law requires a state 
prison term (rather than jail or probation), restricts “good time” credits to twenty percent, and 
prohibits plea bargaining.  The key difference between California and other states is that the 
offender’s current crime need not be serious or violent.  About five hundred different felony 
offenses can set the second- or third-strike provisions of the law into motion (Moore, 1999). 
By August 1998, California had sentenced had 40,511 offenders, including 36,043 
second-strikers, under the law (Dickey, 1998).  In comparison, Washington, the first state to pass 
a Three Strikes statute, had sentenced approximately 120 third-strike offenders and three second-
strike offenders under its more restrictive law (Dickey, 1998).  Most other states and the federal 
system had sentenced even fewer prisoners (Gatland, 1998; McMurry, 1997).  The relatively 
narrow Three Strikes laws in most jurisdictions limit strikes-eligible offenses to a small number 
of violent felonies, and require three violent convictions to trigger a mandatory sentence.  In 
some states, the law can be set into motion by more or fewer strikes.  Maryland’s law, for 
example, mandates life without parole when an offender accrues four strikes from a short list of 
violent felonies, and requires that separate prison terms were served for the first three offenses 
(Clark et al., 1997).  Georgia’s law stipulates life without parole after the second violent felony 
  8 
conviction from a list of specified offenses.  However, far fewer offenses are covered by 
Georgia’s law than by California’s (Clark et al., 1997).  By the middle of 1998, three states that 
had implemented Three Strikes in 1994 or 1995 had not yet sentenced any offenders under the 
law, twelve other states had a dozen or fewer Three Strikes convictions, and the federal system 
had sentenced only 35 offenders under its version of Three Strikes (Dickey, 1998).   
Telephone and e-mail interviews with state criminal justice authorities conducted from 
September through November 2006 found that after more than a decade in place, Three Strikes 
still had not been used with great frequency in states other than California, because few offenders 
were eligible to be charged under the far more restrictive terms of most states’ Three Strikes 
laws.  Washington had sentenced 281 offenders under its Three Strikes statute and 66 offenders 
under a Two Strikes provision (State of Washington Sentencing Guidelines Commission, 2006).  
Nevada had 349 “habitual offenders” in its corrections system, and the South Carolina 
Department of Corrections reported seventeen inmates sentenced under its Three Strikes 
legislation and 334 inmates sentenced under the state’s Two Strikes legislation as of June 30, 
2006.4  The Virginia Dept of Corrections reported 316 “three time losers” including individuals 
convicted of murder, robbery and drug offenses out of 35,000 classified inmates as of Dec 30, 
2005.5  Pennsylvania’s “repeat offender mandatory sentences – second, third, and subsequent 
                                                 
4 Personal communication by e-mail from Alejandra C. Livingston, Economist III, Statistics & Planning, Nevada 
Department of Corrections (October 6, 2006); e-mail from Deanne Williams, South Carolina Department of 
Corrections, Division of RIM (October 12, 2006). 
5 Telephone interview with Helen Hanshaw, Research Division, Virginia Department of Corrections (September 12, 
2006). 
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strikes – have rarely been imposed,” with “only about ten to fifteen cases per year.”6  The 
Arkansas Department of Correction housed 56 Three Strikes inmates, North Carolina reported 
twenty-six convictions up to July 31, 2006, Wisconsin had twenty-five cases, Tennessee had 
twelve, and other states had also made sparing use of the law, with only eight inmates in New 
Jersey and three in Vermont serving “Three Strikes” sentences, and five inmates sentenced under 
Maryland’s “Four Strikes” law.7  Nine “Three-Time Felony Offenders” and five “Repeat Sexual 
Batterers” had been sentenced under Florida’s law, which also includes separate provisions for 
drug trafficking and offenses against law enforcement officers and senior citizens.8  Alaska 
reported two Three Strikes cases, Connecticut reported one case, and Montana and Utah reported 
                                                 
6 Personal communication by e-mail from Douglas E. Hoffman, Director, Center for Research, Evaluation, and 
Statistical Analysis, Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency (September 15, 2006).  
7 Dr. Mike Cannon, Research and Planning, Arkansas Department of Correction; Richard Burkhart, North Carolina 
Policy and Development Analyst II; Kristi Waits, Wisconsin Sentencing Commission; Mike Gasiecki, Statistical 
Analyst Supervisor, Tennessee Dept. of Correction; Matthew Schuman, New Jersey Department of Correction; John 
Perry, Vermont Department of Corrections; Robert Gibson, Director, Planning and Statistics, Maryland Department 
of Public Safety and Correctional Services.  Personal communication via telephone and e-mail received between 
September 13, 2006 and September 27, 2006. 
8 “Of the inmate population on June 30, 2006, a total of 2,547 offenders have been sentenced to Florida’s prison 
system under one or more of the provisions of the Three Time Felony Offender Law.”  Aside from the nine Three-
Time offenders and five “Repeat Sexual Batters,” the vast majority (2,398) were incarcerated for “Drug 
Trafficking,” 114 were sentenced under other sections regarding aggravated assault or battery on a law enforcement 
officer, and the rest (21) had violated another provision protecting senior citizens from assault and battery.  Florida 
statistics and quotation provided by David Ensley, Bureau of Research and Data Analysis, Florida Department of 
Corrections, July 17, 2006. 
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that their Three Strikes laws had never been used.9  Every state other than California reported 
fewer than 400 second- and third-strikes convictions since the passage of Three Strikes.  In 
contrast, by the end of 2003, a total of 80,087 second-strikers and 7,332 third-strikers had been 
admitted to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation  (California District 
Attorney's Association, 2004).  The total has most likely exceeded 100,000 “strikers” by now.   
California’s Three Strikes policy is particularly atypical in that it is widely applied 
towards nonviolent offenders.  As of 2005, thirty-seven percent of second- and third-strike 
offenders had been incarcerated for “crimes against persons,” thirty percent for property crimes, 
twenty-three percent for drug offenses, and ten percent for other offenses such as weapons 
possession (Legislative Analyst's Office, 2005).  In contrast, 96 percent of the cases prosecuted 
under Three Strikes in Washington by March 2006 involved violent offenses (State of 
Washington Sentencing Guidelines Commission, 2006).10  Most states’ Three Strikes laws are 
even more narrowly written than Washington’s: very few offenses are eligible to be counted as 
strikes, and all three “strikes” and the current offense must be violent for Three Strikes to be 
applied (Clark et al., 1997; National Conference of State Legislatures, 1996). 
                                                 
9 Alan McKelvie, Director, Statistical Analysis Center, University of Alaska Anchorage Justice Center; Dewey Hall, 
Acting Manager Statistics and Data Quality, Montana Department of Corrections, and Kelly Dunn, 
Investigator/Paralegal, Legal Services Bureau, Montana Department of Corrections.  Personal communication via e-
mail September 15, 2006 and September 29, 2006.  Robert K. Cosgrove, Director of MIS/Research, Connecticut 
Department of Correction; personal communication via e-mail, November 15, 2006.  E-mail communication with 
Judge Robert Yeates, November 8, 2006. 
10 The other thirteen inmates were sentenced for “burglary 1”(Washington State Sentencing Guidelines Commission, 
2006). 
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California’s Three Strikes statute was designed to be substantially broader than the Three 
Strikes law in any other state.11  This distinction was reaffirmed by California’s voters in 
November 2004, when Proposition 66, a ballot initative that would have brought California’s 
statute more in line with Three Strikes laws in other states by requiring that all three offenses be 
serious or violent, was defeated at the polls (Furillo, 2004; Lundstrom, 2004; Walters, 2004).12  
Because of the tremendous difference in scope and scale, one might expect California’s law to 
influence crime rates differently than Three Strikes laws in other states.  Most research has 
focused on impacts in California (Auerhahn, 2002, 2003; Greenwood et al., 1994; J. R. Ramirez 
& Crano, 2003; Shepherd, 2002; Stolzenberg & D'Alessio, 1997; Walsh, 1999; Worrall, 2004).  
The analysis in this paper examines the effects of Three Strikes legislation in California as well 
as in the rest of the nation, but the statistical models are designed to treat California’s Three 
Strikes policy as distinct from the policies in other states.   
 
Hypothesis 
 
The primary purpose of the analyses that follow is to determine whether Three Strikes 
laws have had significantly greater effects on crime in California than elsewhere in the United 
States.  Because California’s law affects many more criminals than the law in any other state, the 
                                                 
11 The unusual breadth of the law may be due in part to the fact that it was originally passed as a ballot initiative.  As 
such, it did not have to withstand the same formal review or fiscal scrutiny that a bill proposed by the Legislature 
would have undergone. The language of the ballot initiative was drafted not by a professional policymaker, but 
rather by an irate citizen, grieving over the murder of his daughter, and the public’s support for the law was fueled in 
part by widespread fear and anger over the well-publicized murder of another young girl, Polly Klaas, by a 
remorseless repeat offender (Moore, 1999). 
12 Because the Three Strikes law was passed as a ballot initiative before a nearly identical bill was passed by the 
legislature, it can only be repealed or modified by means of a subsequent ballot initiative. 
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impacts of Three Strikes in California on crime rates are expected to be greater than the effects 
on the de minimis laws in place in most other states that have any such law.  The infrequently-
applied laws in states other than California are not expected to reduce crime via either deterrence 
or incapacitation. 
 
Data and Methodology 
The unit of observation in the analyses in this paper is the state-year.  The data are 
measured at the state level, and the dataset covers all fifty American states for each of the 
seventeen years from 1986 through 2005, for a total of one thousand observations.  State-level 
data are substantively appropriate to the task at hand.  Three Strikes laws are adopted at the state 
level of government, and this paper seeks to assess the effects of the law’s presence or absence 
across multiple states.  County-to-county heterogeneity in Three Strikes usage exists within the 
state of California because district attorneys and judges exercise discretion in their 
implementation of the law (Walsh, 1999; Zimring, Hawkins, & Kamin, 2001), but most states 
other than California have applied the law so infrequently that an analysis at a lower level of 
aggregation would not be practical or meaningful.  Thus, studies that rely on county-level data 
are generally limited to examining the effects of Three Strikes in California.  A second benefit of 
state-level data is availability.  Time series are available for all of the relevant crime data, 
multiple measures of economic well-being, demographic statistics including race/ethnicity and 
age, and budget statistics for all fifty states. 
There do exist drawbacks to using state-level data.  When city, county, state, or country-
level data are used, aggregation bias becomes a concern.  Heterogeneity among units is “washed 
out” when data are combined into average values (Spelman, 2005; Trumbull, 1989).  In addition, 
  13 
aggregate data may result in biased inferences if information loss is nonrandom (G. King, 1997).  
For example, intentional or unintentional underreporting of crime incidents by certain local 
police departments, or underreporting of certain types of crimes by individual victims, may lead 
to county or state-level data that produce biased, sometimes inflated, estimates of deterrent 
effects (Cherry, 1999; Trumbull, 1989; Worrall & Pratt, 2004).  Unfortunately, limitations like 
these are inherent in studies that rely on aggregate data.  Despite the potential shortcomings of 
state-level data, this level of aggregation is appropriate for the nationwide analysis in this paper.   
The law has been adopted at the state level, and outside of California, with the exception of only 
a handful of states that have applied the law to more than a dozen offenders a year, little variance 
in the number of Three Strikes cases can be found between units smaller than the state, as the 
number of inmates affected by the law in nearly every county in most years has been zero or 
close to zero. 
Dependent Variables 
The analyses that follow examine the impacts of Three Strikes policies on the seven 
individual crime categories reported annually by local law enforcement agencies to the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation.  They are (1) murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, (2) forcible rape, 
(3) robbery, (4) aggravated assault, (5) burglary, (6) larceny-theft, and (7) motor vehicle theft.13   
Among these seven offenses, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft can be described as 
primarily “instrumental crimes” (J. R. Ramirez & Crano, 2003).  These offenses, committed for 
material gain, are likely to involve advance planning or decision-making, while violent offenses, 
such as homicide, rape, or aggravated assault, are more likely to be committed out of anger or 
                                                 
13 The Uniform Crime Reports have also included arson since 1978, but the reporting of this offense has been 
infrequent and inconsistent; thus, arson is almost always omitted from studies using UCR Index Crime statistics. 
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passion.  Although the FBI categorizes robbery as a violent offense, it is usually “instrumental” 
in nature.  The distinction between instrumental and violent offenses may have implications for 
the effectiveness of deterrence efforts via Three Strikes laws: “instrumental” crimes may be 
deterred more readily not only because of the more “rational” nature of the offenses, but also 
because the marginal increases in sentence length are greatest for less-serious felonies that would 
carry the shortest sentences in the absence of Three Strikes. 
Policy Variables 
The primary independent variables of interest are those representing the presence of 
“Three Strikes and You’re Out” laws.  Additional attention is given in the model to California, 
which has an anomalous Three Strikes law, and to the state of Washington, which implemented 
Three Strikes earliest.  Washington has one of the most widely implemented policies outside 
California.  The method of coding these policy interventions is explained in further detail below. 
As a test of whether other policy changes deserve credit for changes in crime rates, a 
second policy intervention, Truth in Sentencing, is also included in the model.  Truth in 
Sentencing (TIS) policies, requiring certain sentenced offenders to serve 85 percent or more of 
their sentences, gained popularity in the United States around the same time that Three Strikes 
laws began to proliferate.  TIS laws with an 85 percent requirement were adopted in 28 states, 
with encouragement from the U.S. Congress in the form of formula-based federal grants 
authorized in the 1994 Violent Offender Incarceration/Truth in Sentencing (VOI/TIS) Act 
(Sabol, Rosich, Kane, Kirk, & Dubin, 2002; Turner, Fain, Greenwood, Chen, & Chiesa, 2001; 
Turner, Greenwood, Fain, & Chiesa, 2006; U.S. General Accounting Office, 1998).  States with 
TIS in place overlap partially with those that adopted Three Strikes.  Separate terms are 
introduced in the model to represent the presence of Three Strikes and TIS in California, Three 
  15 
Strikes in Washington, and TIS in Washington.  The variable representing California’s Three 
Strikes policy measures changes in the dependent variables that took place after 1994.  Since 
California implemented both Three Strikes and Truth in Sentencing in 1994, it is not possible, 
using annual data, to separate the effects of Three Strikes from those of Truth in Sentencing.14  
However, Truth in Sentencing laws vary far less from state to state than Three Strikes laws, in 
part because the U.S. Department of Justice required state TIS laws to satisfy specific criteria in 
order to earn federal VOI/TIS grants (Turner et al., 2001).  The grant program stipulated that 
states had to require offenders convicted of murder, criminal sexual assault, robbery and 
aggravated assault to serve at least 85 percent of their sentences, or demonstrate that time served 
in prison by these offenders averaged at least 85 percent (Ditton & Wilson, 1999).  Because of 
the relative uniformity in TIS policies, California’s Truth in Sentencing law is not expected to 
have effects on crime noticeably different from the effects of TIS policies in other states.  In 
Washington State, TIS with an 85 percent time-served requirement was adopted in 1990, three 
years before Three Strikes was passed; therefore, the effects of the two policies in Washington 
can be estimated using two separate independent variables.  
Several control variables are included in the analyses, corresponding to factors that are 
believed to influence crime rates.  These include measures of economic well-being 
(unemployment rate, poverty rate, and median household income), state and local government 
spending (percent of budget spent on police, corrections, and education), and demographic 
                                                 
14 In fact, the effects of other, concurrent, policy changes or other factors which may have impacted the dependent 
variables in these same years would also be “picked up” by these interaction terms, and the same may be true of the 
other dummy variables for Three Strikes and TIS.   
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composition of the population (proportion of the population in several different age groups, 
percent African-American, and percent Hispanic). 
Regression Model 
The impacts of Three Strikes are empirically estimated in this paper using time-series 
cross-sectional (TSCS) analysis with fixed effects.  This method can be applied when data are 
available for numerous observations over a series of points in time.  TSCS analysis of state-level 
data is useful for the study of quasi-experiments like state-level policy interventions; it “provides 
control groups because the other 49 states act as controls when analyzing each individual state 
law, and permits one to enter a large number of control variables” (Marvell & Moody, 1996).  
Researchers can look for consistent effects of new legislation in states that have widely varying 
“starting points” in terms of existing crime rates and whose implementation of new laws 
occurred in several different years.  Other benefits include substantial increases in sample size 
compared to panel data or time series only data, and therefore more degrees of freedom, which 
allows for inclusion of more control variables and improves the statistical efficiency of the 
estimates (Sayrs, 1989; Stimson, 1985). 
The linear regression model used here measures whether the implementation of Three 
Strikes and Truth in Sentencing resulted in faster or slower growth or declines in crime rates.  
The model has the following functional form: 
ln (Dependent Variable) =  
α + 1 (Underlying trend in Three Strikes states) 
+ 2 (New trend in Three Strikes states after the law) 
+ 3 (Three Strikes dummy variable)  
+ 4 (Underlying trend in California) 
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+ 5 (New trend in California after Three Strikes & TIS) 
+ 6 (California Three Strikes dummy variable) 
+ 7 (Underlying trend Washington) 
+ 8 (New trend in Washington after Three Strikes) 
+ 9 (New trend in Washington after TIS) 
+ 10 (Washington Three Strikes dummy variable) 
+ 11 (Underlying trend in TIS states) 
+ 12 (New trend in TIS states after the law) 
+ 13 (Unemployment rate)it 
+ 14 (Percent of population in poverty)it 
+ 15 (Statewide median household income in tens of thousands of 2006 dollars)it 
+ 16 (Percent of population that is African-American)it 
+ 17 (Percent of population that is Hispanic)it 
+ 18 (Percent of population under age 5)it 
+ 19 (Percent of population ages 5 to 17)it 
+ 20 (Percent of population ages 18 to 24)it 
+ 21 (Percent of population ages 25 to 44)it 
+ 22 (Percent of population ages 65 and up)it 
+ 23…42 (Year Fixed Effects) 
+ 43…92 (State Fixed Effects)   
 
The dependent variables (crime rates) are natural-logarithm transformed, for ease of 
interpretation, to approximate a normal distribution more closely, and to reduce 
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heteroskedasticity.  In regressions of the natural logarithm of a dependent variable on 
untransformed continuous independent variables, the coefficients on the independent variables 
(e.g. unemployment rate, percentage ages 18-24) can be interpreted as the percentage change in 
Y (i.e. crime rate) that results from a one unit increase in X, at the mean values of the 
independent variables.  A one-unit increase in each of the dummy variables representing Three 
Strikes or TIS can be substantively interpreted as the presence of that policy.   
The subscript i represents state, and the subscript t represents year.  The term “Year Fixed 
Effects” represents a series of year dummy variables (1987 to 2005, with 1986 as the reference), 
and the term “State Fixed Effects” represents a series of state dummy variables.  Year fixed 
effects are necessary because crime trends were not flat before or after the implementation of the 
law.  Crime rates skyrocketed throughout the 1980s, then began to decline shortly before most 
Three Strikes laws went into effect and continued to fall after the laws were in place.  If the 
downward turn in crime rates preceding the introduction of Three Strikes is not taken into 
consideration, the crime-reduction impact of the law is likely to be overestimated.  Year fixed 
effects serve as a proxy for the numerous excluded factors that may have influenced national 
crime trends over the time period covered by the dataset.  State fixed effects are included 
because the rates of crime vary widely from state to state.  These fixed effects control for 
excluded factors that affect interstate variation in crime.  Individual dummy variables allow each 
state to have a different Y-intercept.  Because great deal of variation exists between states in the 
crime rates that serve as dependent variables, the state dummy variables are likely to absorb 
many of the apparent impacts that might be observed if state fixed effects were omitted.  A 
regression model that includes state fixed effects will therefore produce conservative estimates of 
the impacts of Three Strikes and other independent variables, only measuring the effects that the 
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independent variables would have had on changes in crime within states over time (D. R. 
Johnson, 1995).  In this analysis, the results of a test of fixed vs. random effects using an 
artificial regression approach indicates that the regressors are correlated with the group-specific 
errors associated with the individual states; the fixed effects specification is more consistent than 
the random-effects model for these data.15 
It is quite possible that Three Strikes and non-Three Strikes states differ not only in their 
levels of crime after the laws’ implementation, but also in the rates of change in crime that 
preceded the adoption of the policy.  These differences may even have played a role in states’ 
decisions regarding whether to enact Three Strikes.  For example, legislators or voters in states 
experiencing unusually rapid growth (or slower declines) in crime rates could have been more 
likely to decide that existing policies were inadequate and Three Strikes was necessary.  With 
this in mind, the variables representing the effects of Three Strikes are designed so that post-
Three Strikes trends in crime are measured while controlling for underlying pre-Three-Strikes 
crime trends.  Separate variables represent underlying pre-implementation trends in Three Strikes 
states and trends in Three Strikes states after Three Strikes.  The “Underlying Trend” variable is 
a simple linear trend, coded 0 for the year t of implementation, -1, -2, -3, ... for the years t-1, t-2, 
t-3, etc., and 1, 2, 3, ... for the years t+1, t+2, t+3, etc.   
The “New Trend” variables are coded 0 for all years until adoption, then 1, 2, 3, ... for 
years after implementation.  The coefficients associated with these variables represent the 
differences between Three Strikes and non-Three Strikes states in the year-to-year changes in 
crime rates before and after the passage of “Three Strikes and You’re Out.”   
                                                 
15 This test was conducted using the “xtoverid” function in STATA because the Hausman test produced undefined 
results.  Details available at http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s456779.html. 
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In addition, dummy variables representing the presence of Three Strikes nationally, in 
California, and in Washington are included.  One might expect the post-Three-Strikes dummy 
variable to have a negative and significant coefficient if a new Three Strikes law has had a 
deterrent effect that would lead some would-be offenders to cease or curtail their criminal 
activity immediately after the law’s adoption.  The post-Three-Strikes trend variable would have 
a negative and significant coefficient if Three Strikes laws have led to effects that grow over 
time, such as the incapacitation effects associated with increased length of incarceration. 
 
Findings and Discussion 
 The results of the regression analysis are shown in Table 2 below.  For ease of 
presentation, coefficients corresponding to the individual year and state dummy variables are 
omitted from the table. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Effects of Three Strikes on Different Crime Types in California vs. Other States 
The analysis produces both expected and unexpected results with regard to the impacts of 
Three Strikes on crime rates.  The coefficient associated with the crime trend in Three Strikes 
states after the law’s adoption is negative and statistically significant for each of the 
“instrumental offenses”: robbery, burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft.  The effects 
are not large, but they are consistent.  Relative to the declines in crime already taking place 
nationwide and captured by the year fixed effects, the robbery rate in Three Strikes states fell 3 
percent more rapidly, in the years after the law’s adoption.  The rate of burglary fell 1.8 percent 
more quickly, larceny-theft fell 1.1 percent faster, and motor vehicle theft fell 2 percent faster in 
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Three Strikes states each year the law was in place.  At first glance, this seems to support the 
hypothesis that policies intended to deter crime are most effective against offenses that are likely 
to involve premeditation or rational decision-making, as opposed to “crimes of passion.”  
However, the Three Strikes dummy variable, which is intended to capture deterrent effects, is 
associated with non-significant coefficients for every category of crime except murder.  These 
findings are somewhat puzzling, particularly because nonviolent offenses like burglary, larceny, 
and motor vehicle theft are not eligible for sentencing under Three Strikes in most states, and 
therefore rates of those offenses would not be expected to decline as a result of Three Strikes-
related incapacitation effects.   
In California, the coefficient on the Three Strikes dummy variable was negative and 
significant for two offenses: motor vehicle theft (β = -.328, p < .05) and robbery (β = -.271, p < 
.10), suggesting that some deterrent effects might exist with regard to these types of crime.  
Contrary to expectations, although statistically significant crime-reduction effects on some crime 
types were found for Three Strikes policies nationwide, few additional incapacitation effects 
were measurable in California, the state in which the greatest deterrence and incapacitation 
effects would be expected.  (The moderately-used Three Strikes law in Washington also had no 
extra effects beyond those shared by Three Strikes states throughout the country.16) 
The preceding findings lead to the question: if about 100,000 offenders have been 
sentenced under California’s Three Strikes law, why would the effects on crime in California be 
mostly undetectable?  A brief examination of prison capacities and populations may provide part 
                                                 
16 The only statistically significant additional effect of Washington’s Three Strikes law was found for burglary, but 
this effect was in the “wrong” (positive) direction (p < .05).  Here it may be useful to note that the sheer number of 
coefficient estimates produced in these analyses virtually guarantees a few “false positive” findings of statistical 
significance. 
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of the answer.  Table 3 below displays California’s prison capacity and prison population 
statistics for the period from 1986 to 2005.  Neither capacity nor population has grown to an 
extent commensurate with the number of offenders sentenced under Three Strikes.  From 1994, 
the year of the law’s passage, until 2005, design capacity increased by 18,884 beds, while the 
population of the state’s severely overcrowded prisons increased by 47,898 inmates.  Due to 
constraints on population growth, the entry to prison of new inmates with mandatory sentences, 
or lengthened sentences for certain inmates, can occur only if other inmates are released, and a 
Three Strikes incapacitation effect on crime would be observed only if the inmates leaving prison 
are less likely to offend than those who are entering or staying longer as a result of the law.  
Contrary to the theory of “selective incapacitation,” California’s law could actually create the 
unintended effect of forcing authorities to use limited prison space to warehouse nonviolent 
offenders and those who have aged beyond the peak of their “criminal careers.”17  Further 
research is needed to examine this more closely.   
 [Table 3 about here] 
An alternative explanation may be that a crime reduction effect does exist, but it cannot 
be measured with statistical significance in this analysis due to the limitations of the statistical 
tests used here.  While the coefficient estimates associated with the California post-Three Strikes 
trend variables are not statistically significant, the analyses do produce consistently negative 
coefficients for every crime category except rape. 
                                                 
17 Unlike many other prisoners, inmates sentenced under Three Strikes may not have their prison terms reduced by 
more than 20 percent using “good time” credits, while some other inmates may be eligible for up to a 50 percent 
reduction for “good time” (Legislative Analyst's Office, 2005). 
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A noteworthy incidental finding from this analysis is that statistically significant and 
positive coefficients were found for the variable representing the crime trend in Three Strikes 
states before the adoption of the law for robbery, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft.  In 
other words, the states that passed Three Strikes laws did so as they were experiencing slower 
declines (compared to non-adopting states) in their rates of several crimes.  This suggests that the 
desire to gain greater control over crime rates may have provided an impetus for legislatures or 
voters (through ballot initiatives) to support and enact “get tough” policies such as Three Strikes. 
Another notable finding is that the Three Strikes dummy variable carries a positive and 
significant (p < .01) coefficient for only one category of crime, murder.  Murder rates appear to 
have increased about 12.9 percent more rapidly (or fallen 12.9 percent less rapidly) in states with 
Three Strikes laws in place. This result is consistent, in both direction and magnitude, with the 
findings of some prior researchers (Kovandzic et al., 2002, 2004; Marvell & Moody, 2001), who 
have speculated that the fear of a long mandatory sentence may motivate some criminals to 
attempt to eliminate witnesses or resist law enforcement officers.  It is surprising, however, that 
the effect is observed nationwide but is not especially pronounced in California, the state with 
the broadest and most highly publicized Three Strikes law. 
Although skeptics might believe that many narrowly-drawn Three Strikes policies may 
have been designed to create the appearance of getting tough on crime while actually being 
applied to very few offenders, the results of the analysis suggest that some real effects may be 
observable.  On the other hand, given the small number of criminals incarcerated under most 
Three Strikes laws, the crime effects in Three Strikes states other than California cannot be 
attributed entirely to the incapacitation of habitual offenders.  There are two plausible alternative 
explanations.  The laws may have had deterrent effects that somehow increased over time.  This 
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explanation is consistent with the finding that greater impacts were found for more readily 
deterred instrumental offenses, though it is unclear why the effects would grow over the years.  
Another possibility is that one or more variables left out of the model are responsible.  For 
example, the states that adopted Three Strikes may have enacted other crime prevention 
measures (other than Truth in Sentencing, which is included in the model) along with their Three 
Strikes policies.   
Effects of Other Included Variables 
The analysis indicates that Truth in Sentencing (TIS), another sentencing policy that 
gained popularity at about the same time as Three Strikes, had a far smaller impact on crime than 
Three Strikes.  A statistically significant coefficient is associated with Truth in Sentencing 
adoption for only one offense category, burglary.  There were no additional effects associated 
with TIS in Washington State or in California.  The lack of observable effects of Truth in 
Sentencing is not very surprising, for a few reasons.  TIS extends the length of existing 
sentences, rather than sending offenders to prison who otherwise would not have been 
incarcerated.  The marginal incapacitation effects associated with TIS do not take effect until the 
end of the portion of the sentence that an inmate would already have served.  TIS is targeted 
primarily toward violent criminals, though its scope is wider in some states.  Finally, the 
distinction between TIS and non-TIS states is blurred by the fact that many states that did not 
meet the Department of Justice’s 85 percent time served requirement for TIS funding 
nonetheless increased the proportion of time served by violent offenders (Turner et al., 2006). 
Economic factors influence the rates of some crimes, particularly instrumental offenses.  
The unemployment rate has a positive and significant association with three types of crime, rape, 
robbery, and burglary.  Consistent with criminal opportunity theory (higher rates of poverty 
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mean fewer attractive targets), the proportion of state residents living in poverty has no effect on 
violent crime, but it is significantly and negatively associated with the rates of burglary and 
larceny.  The proportion of state and local expenditures spent on corrections is associated with 
significant and negative coefficients for robbery and motor vehicle theft.  The proportions spent 
on police and education have few significant effects.   
The variable representing the percentage of the population that is African-American has a 
negative and significant coefficient in the models for rape, robbery, burglary, larceny, and motor 
vehicle theft, indicating that the rates of these offenses are lower where the proportion of 
African-Americans in the population is higher, when other factors are controlled.  Considering 
the vast literature on the relatively high rates of criminal offending and victimization among 
African-Americans, this outcome contradicts expectations.  However, because this variable is 
relatively time-invariant within jurisdictions, the coefficient estimates associated with this 
variable in a fixed-effects model may be unstable (D. R. Johnson, 1995).  Due to immigration, 
the Hispanic proportion of the population has varied more than the African-American population 
over the time period included in the dataset.18  This variable is associated with a positive 
coefficient in the models for burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft.  As one would expect, 
the percentage of the population in the most crime-prone age group, 18 to 24, is associated with 
higher levels of several offenses: murder, rape, burglary, and motor vehicle theft.   
The inclusion of variables representing underlying crime trends is essential to the 
accuracy of analyses of Three Strikes’ impacts.  When time-series cross-sectional regression 
                                                 
18 According to the United States Census Bureau, the Hispanic population in the United States has increased by 
more than 50 percent since 1990 (Guzman, 2001).  Forty percent of the Hispanic population is foreign born, and 46 
percent of the foreign born population entered the United States between 1990 and 2000 (R. Ramirez, 2004). 
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analysis is performed on the same data without accounting for underlying crime trends in the 
model, dramatically different results are produced.  An improperly specified analysis using only 
dichotomous dummy variables, rather than pre- and post-implementation trend variables, to 
represent the absence or presence of Three Strikes and Truth in Sentencing generates results (not 
shown here) that appear to indicate that California’s Three Strikes law has been an enormous 
success, attributing declines in crime to California’s Three Strikes law ranging from about 17 
percent for burglary to 31 percent for motor vehicle theft.  When pre- and post-Three Strikes 
crime trends are included in the models, the analysis reveals that the drops in crime seemingly 
linked to the uniquely broad Three Strikes policy in California are likely to have occurred even if 
the state had adopted a more limited Three Strikes policy, as several other states did.  These 
observations support those of a previous study (Worrall, 2004) that also controlled for pre-
existing crime trends while using county, rather than state, data.   
 
Conclusions and Policy Implications  
 “Three Strikes and You’re Out” laws have been adopted by half of the American states, 
but California’s policy is much broader than the corresponding habitual offender laws adopted 
elsewhere.  While no other state has incarcerated more than 400 offenders under its Three Strikes 
law, over 100,000 convictions have resulted from California’s policy.  Yet, the approach taken in 
California has not been dramatically more effective at controlling crime than other states’ efforts.  
Some potential reasons for this finding were discussed above, but the question of why a law of 
this scale and scope has not had greater impacts on crime deserves further attention from 
researchers.  
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 Despite the limited usage of Three Strikes statutes in states other than California, the 
law’s presence throughout the United States is associated with accelerated rates of decline for 
robbery, burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft, all of which are potentially deterrable 
“instrumental offenses.”  This finding, in conjunction with data on the relatively few inmates 
incarcerated under Three Strikes policies in most states, suggests that any crime reduction 
associated with the presence of Three Strikes outside California should probably be attributed to 
deterrence effects rather than incarceration effects.   
 The analysis finds that pre-existing conditions in states where Three Strikes was passed 
differed fundamentally from those in states where Three Strikes was not adopted.  Before 
implementing the law, Three Strikes states were experiencing more rapid increases (or slower 
decreases) in crime trends than non-adopting states.  Concern regarding crime rates or patterns 
may have contributed to the policy decisions made by the public or legislatures in these states.  
More thorough analysis of factors that contribute to the policy adoption decision, using the 
passage of Three Strikes as a dependent variable, would be an interesting topic for future 
research.   
This paper’s findings regarding Three Strikes’ impacts in California may disappoint 
proponents of that state’s approach to Three Strikes.  It may, however, provide useful lessons for 
policymakers to consider in the future.  One clear conclusion from the preceding analyses is that 
the “toughest” sentencing policy is not necessarily the most effective option.  The narrowly-
constructed and seldom-used habitual offender policies adopted in many states appear to produce 
results comparable to those observed in California.   
Policies like Three Strikes were not the only factors likely to have contributed to the 
decline in crime throughout the mid- to late 1990s.  Other policy initiatives, which were not 
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operationalized as control variables in the preceding analyses, have been credited with reducing 
crime as well.  These include “zero tolerance” or “quality of life” policing strategies in New 
York City and other locations (Bratton, 1996; Katz, Webb, & Schaefer, 2001; Kelling & Bratton, 
1988), the passage of right-to-carry concealed weapons laws in several states (Lott, 1998; Lott & 
Mustard, 1997; McDonald, 1999; Plassmann & Tideman, 2001), and many other efforts 
throughout the United States.  Criminologists have also noted that the rise and fall of crack 
cocaine markets, and the gun violence directly and indirectly related to the drug trade, have 
coincided with trends in violent crime rates (Beres & Griffith, 1998; Blumstein & Rosenfeld, 
1998; Bowling, 1999; Grogger, 2006; B. Johnson, Golub, & Dunlap, 2000; Wallman & 
Blumstein, 2005; Witkin, 1998).  It is possible that the reductions in crime experienced 
throughout the United States from the early 1990s through the early 2000s resulted from many 
different forces, including Three Strikes laws in some states, and other, contemporaneous, policy 
changes in other places. 
Some scholars believe that these changes in crime rates can hardly be explained at all.  It 
has been suggested that recent drops in crime in many American cities should primarily be 
attributed to “regression to the mean” from preceding periods of rapid growth that reached 
unusually high peaks (Fagan, Zimring, and Kim, 1998).  The causes and correlates of rises and 
declines in crime rates are numerous, diverse, and elusive.  Thus, researchers and policymakers 
must keep in mind that even major changes in sentencing policy may result in only modest 
impacts on crime rates.   
The nonpartisan California Legislative Analyst’s Office estimates that the state’s Three 
Strikes policy currently costs approximately $500 million per year to implement, with expenses 
expected to escalate dramatically in the long run, even if the prison population does not expand 
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further, due to aging of the inmate population and corresponding growth in medical expenses 
(Legislative Analyst's Office, 2005).  The implementation of a policy as costly as Three Strikes 
results in inevitable opportunity costs, not only within the criminal justice domain, but also in 
other vital policy areas.  California faced a budget shortfall of $16 billion at the beginning of 
2008; in response, the 2008-09 budget set forth by the Governor proposed dramatic across-the-
board spending cuts including a reduction of $400 million in payments for K-14 education, cuts 
in spending for state universities, reductions in medical benefits for the poor, the suspension of a 
cost-of-living adjustment for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits, and even the early 
release of some prison inmates (California Legislative Analyst's Office, 2008).  Scaling back 
California’s Three Strikes law could free up millions of dollars a year for the preservation of 
important public goods and services in the nation’s most populous state. 
Three Strikes, as implemented in California, could be cost-beneficial despite its high 
price tag if it were shown to save money by reducing crime, but the results of the present study 
indicate that crime effects of a similar magnitude could have been obtained by more efficient 
means than California’s unusually broad Three Strikes policy.  In a 2001 paper entitled “How 
Large Should the Strike Zone Be?” Caulkins describes the trade-offs involved in designing a 
Three Strikes statute that is broad in scope (like California’s law) or narrow (like the laws in 
Pennsylvania and most other states).  He explains that a narrow law is likely to be more cost-
effective, as it will target high-rate offenders to serve the longest sentences; on the other hand, a 
broad law should be expected to have a bigger impact on crime, but at a far higher cost per crime 
averted (Caulkins, 2001).  To an extent, the results presented above confirm this expectation.  In 
allowing felony offenses that are neither serious nor violent to trigger second- and third-strike 
sentences, California’s policy seems to extend beyond the point of diminishing marginal returns.  
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Narrowly-constructed laws, such as those in most other states, appear to be associated with slight 
crime reduction effects for certain categories of offenses, but the additional crime-reducing 
benefits of California’s far broader policy are small or nonexistent for nearly every category of 
crime, while the costs associated with this extra breadth are considerable. 
The law has led to less growth in California’s prison population than some initial 
forecasts predicted (see, for example, Greenwood et al. 1994), due to factors including declines 
in crime and the exercise of discretion by some prosecutors and judges in the law’s 
implementation (California District Attorney's Association, 2004; Walsh, 2004).19  Nevertheless, 
over 100,000 individuals have already received either second- or third-strike sentences since the 
law took effect in 1994 (Legislative Analyst's Office, 2005).  Along with financial costs, the 
increased rate of incarceration imposes enormous human and social costs for sentenced 
individuals, their families, and the communities from which inmates come and to which many of 
them eventually return (for discussion, see e.g. Mauer & Chesney-Lind, 2002; Travis, 2002; 
Travis & Waul, 2003).  In California, these social costs are borne disproportionately by African-
American men, who constitute only about 3 percent of the state’s population but represent 
approximately 33 percent of second-strikers and 44 percent of third-strikers among California 
prison inmates (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 2008; United States 
                                                 
19 “In the furtherance of justice,” prosecutors and judges retain the discretion to dismiss some prior strike offenses in 
order to avoid triggering a second-or third-strike sentence (Legislative Analyst's Office, 2005).  For certain offenses 
known as “wobblers,” prosecutors also have the authority to charge cases either as felonies, which could lead to 
second- or third-strike sentences for offenders with prior “strikes,” or misdemeanors, which carry a maximum 
sentence of one year in jail (Legislative Analyst's Office, 2005; Ricciardulli, 2002).  
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Census Bureau, 2006).20  Thus, another non-monetary cost of California’s Three Strikes law may 
be erosion of the perception of fairness and legitimacy in the state’s criminal sentencing process, 
particularly among the most heavily impacted populations.   
 Three Strikes is one of numerous “get-tough” policies adopted throughout the United 
States in response to concerns about rising crime rates in the 1990s.  The evidence presented 
above indicates that the presence of a Three Strikes law is associated with modest crime 
reduction effects nationally, and that California’s version of the law is not considerably more 
effective at crime reduction than alternative methods that are narrower in scope.  Regardless of 
its limited effects on crime, however, California’s Three Strikes policy will continue to produce 
tremendous and lasting ramifications for prison population growth, state budgets, and tens of 
thousands of human lives, unless the state’s voters decide to reduce the scope of the law at some 
point in the future.
                                                 
20 Overrepresentation of African-Americans among those sentenced under Three Strikes has been found to persist 
even when variables such as current offense and prior record are controlled (Chen, 2008). 
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Table 1: “Three Strikes” and Similar Repeat Offender Laws in the United States21 
 
State Year Passed 
(Amended) 
Law  
Alaska 2006 Stat. § 12.55.125  
Arkansas 1995 S 123 
California  1994 A 971 and Proposition 184 
Colorado  1994 S 196  
Connecticut  1994 H 5385  
Florida  1995 S 168 
Georgia  1994 S 441 
Indiana  1994 H 1063 
Kansas  1994 H 2788 
Louisiana 1994 (1995) H 18  
Maryland  1994 H 1112  
Montana  1995 S 66 
Nevada  1995 A 317 
New Jersey  1995 A 318 
New Mexico  1994 S 73 and 742, Chapter 24  
North Carolina  1994 H 39, Part 6, Chapter 22   
North Dakota  1995 H 1218 
Pennsylvania  1995 H 93 
South Carolina  1995 H 3096 
Tennessee  1994 (1995) H 2759 
Utah  1995 H 46 
Vermont  1995 S 51 
Virginia  1994 (1995) H 273 
Washington  1993 Initiative 593 
Wisconsin 1994 1993 S 781, Act 289 
 
                                                 
21 Source for all states except Alaska: National Conference of State Legislatures, “Three Strikes” Legislation 
Update, December 1997.  Alaska law information obtained via personal communication with Ms. Teri Carnes, 
Senior Staff Associate, Alaska Judicial Council, September 22, 2006. 
 
  
Table 2: Regression Results (Dependent Variables ln-transformed) 
 
  Murd.   Rape   Robb.   
Aggr. 
Asslt.   Burg.   Larc.   
MV 
Theft   
  Coef.    Coef.    Coef.    Coef.    Coef.    Coef.    Coef.    
  S.E.   S.E.   S.E.   S.E.   S.E.   S.E.   S.E.   
Underlying trend in 3-strikes states 0.005  -0.006  0.023 *** 0.005  0.014 *** 0.006 ** 0.020 *** 
 0.008  0.005  0.006  0.006  0.004  0.003  0.007  
Trend in 3-strikes states after 3-strikes -0.007  -0.006  -0.030 *** 0.006  -0.018 *** -0.011 *** -0.023 *** 
 0.009  0.006  0.008  0.008  0.005  0.004  0.008  
3-strikes dummy 0.129 *** 0.037  -0.045  0.008  -0.020  -0.007  0.003  
 0.048  0.031  0.038  0.038  0.024  0.020  0.041  
Underlying trend in CA 0.026  -0.026  0.018  0.012  -0.013  -0.022  -0.019  
 0.032  0.021  0.026  0.026  0.016  0.013  0.028  
Trend in CA after 3-strikes -0.026  0.003  -0.037  -0.043  0.007  0.020  0.045  
 0.037  0.024  0.030  0.030  0.018  0.015  0.032  
CA 3-strikes dummy -0.230  0.015  -0.271 * -0.072  -0.081  -0.100  -0.328 ** 
 0.194  0.128  0.156  0.157  0.096  0.081  0.167  
Underlying trend in WA -0.046  0.053  -0.007  0.007  -0.076 * -0.043  0.017  
 0.081  0.053  0.065  0.065  0.040  0.034  0.070  
Trend in WA after 3-strikes 0.016  0.007  0.025  -0.033  0.078 ** 0.009  0.047  
 0.062  0.041  0.050  0.050  0.031  0.026  0.054  
WA 3-strikes dummy 0.150  -0.077  0.037  -0.019  0.120  0.014  0.051  
 0.198  0.130  0.160  0.160  0.098  0.083  0.170  
Trend in WA after TIS 0.016  -0.075  -0.017  0.007  0.018  0.038  -0.006  
 0.125  0.083  0.101  0.101  0.062  0.052  0.108  
Underlying trend in TIS states -0.004  -0.004  -0.003  0.000  0.003 ** 0.001  0.012 *** 
 0.004  0.002  0.003  0.003  0.002  0.001  0.003  
Trend in TIS states after TIS -0.001  0.001  -0.004  0.003  -0.005 ** -0.001  -0.007  
  0.005   0.003   0.004   0.004   0.002   0.002   0.004   
Unemployment rate 0.007  0.013 ** 0.015 ** -0.039 *** 0.013 *** -0.003  -0.005  
 0.009  0.006  0.007  0.007  0.004  0.004  0.008  
% of pop. in poverty -0.004  0.003  0.000  0.000  -0.007 *** -0.008 *** 0.001  
 0.005  0.003  0.004  0.004  0.002  0.002  0.004  
 
  
Table 2, Continued 
  Murd.   Rape   Robb.   
Aggr. 
Asslt.   Burg.   Larc.   
MV 
Theft   
  Coef.    Coef.    Coef.    Coef.    Coef.    Coef.    Coef.    
  S.E.   S.E.   S.E.   S.E.   S.E.   S.E.   S.E.   
Median HH income 0.000 * 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 *** 
 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
% of state/local expenditures on police 0.023  -0.031  -0.030  0.010  -0.021  -0.006  -0.029  
 0.027  0.018  0.022  0.022  0.013  0.011  0.023  
% of state/local exp. on corrections -0.009  -0.005  -0.019 * 0.015  -0.011  -0.008  -0.031 *** 
 0.014  0.009  0.011  0.011  0.007  0.006  0.012  
% of state/local exp. on education 0.007 *** 0.002  -0.001  0.001  -0.001  -0.002  -0.003  
 0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.001  0.001  0.002  
% of pop. black 0.025  -0.066 *** -0.029 ** -0.005  -0.024 *** -0.017 ** -0.070 *** 
 0.018  0.012  0.014  0.014  0.009  0.007  0.015  
% of pop. Hispanic -0.001  0.000  0.000  0.002  0.002 *** 0.002 ** 0.005 *** 
 0.002  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.002  
% of pop. under age 5 0.023  -0.150 *** -0.004  0.055 ** 0.028 ** 0.038 *** 0.188 *** 
 0.027  0.018  0.021  0.022  0.013  0.011  0.023  
% of pop. ages 5-17 -0.017 * -0.008  -0.053 *** -0.055 *** -0.060 *** -0.031 *** -0.085 *** 
 0.010  0.007  0.008  0.008  0.005  0.004  0.009  
% of pop. ages 18-24 0.060 *** 0.063 *** 0.017  0.012  0.012 ** 0.002  0.050 *** 
 0.013  0.008  0.010  0.010  0.006  0.005  0.011  
% of pop. ages 25-44 -0.006  0.030 *** 0.003  -0.021 *** 0.012 *** 0.006  -0.024 *** 
 0.009  0.006  0.007  0.007  0.004  0.004  0.008  
% of pop. ages 65 and up -0.013  -0.025 ** 0.063 *** 0.080 *** 0.038 *** 0.003  0.082 *** 
 0.015  0.010  0.012  0.012  0.008  0.006  0.013  
(Yr. 1987-2005 dummies omitted)               
Constant 0.829 ** 3.536 *** 4.561 *** 5.719 *** 7.237 *** 8.341 *** 5.574 *** 
 0.400  0.263  0.322  0.324  0.199  0.167  0.344  
R-squared within 0.467   0.453   0.476   0.379   0.830   0.648   0.423   
R-squared between 0.459  0.057  0.194  0.070  0.154  0.009  0.065  
R-squared overall 0.443  0.022  0.112  0.014  0.004  0.020  0.033  
N 999   999   999   999   999   999   999   
  
Table 3: California Prison Capacity and Prison Population, 1986-200522 
Year Design Capacity Prison Population 
1986 32,853 57,725 
1987 41,094 64,812 
1988 46,279 73,780 
1989 48,311 84,338 
1990 52,698 94,122 
1991 55,692 98,515 
1992 57,367 105,467 
1993 63,293 115,573 
1994 68,366 121,084 
1995 71,641 131,745 
1996 72,621 142,865 
1997 76,352 152,739 
1998 79,875 159,201 
1999 80,272 160,517 
2000 80,467 160,412 
2001 79,957 157,295 
2002 80,587 161,361 
2003 80,487 164,487 
2004 80,890 166,556 
2005 87,250 168,982 
 
 
                                                 
22 Sources: United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics.  Prisoners in [Year] reports, 1986 
through 2005.   
